
Total Entries: 1046
Select one of the above filters
Year Filter:

Senator Henry Bellmon questions the calorie cutting consensus presented at a subcommittee on obesity.
In 1977, in one of the more perverse episodes in the history of our ongoing discourse on obesity, a subcommittee of the U.S. Congress held a hearing in which the assembled congressional members listened to the leading academic experts of the day expound on the cause and treatment of obesity and its supposedly vital relationship to calories consumed and expended.
The testimony left Henry Bellmon, a senator from Oklahoma, scratching his head, perhaps because Bellmon seemed to know what it was like to fatten easily and struggle with his weight. Maybe he was talking about himself. If not, it was surely a loved one who had opened his mind. “I want to be sure we don’t oversimplify,” Bellmon said.
“… We make it sound like there is no problem for those of us who are overweight except to push back from the table sooner. But I watched Senator [Robert] Dole in the Senate dining room, a double dip of ice cream, a piece of blueberry pie, meat and potatoes, yet he stays as lean as a west Kansas coyote. Some of the rest of us who live on lettuce, cottage cheese and RyKrisp don’t do nearly as well. Is there a difference in individuals as to how they utilize fuel?”
The experts in attendance acknowledged that they “constantly hear anecdotes of this type,” but they could offer no other words of explanation. Their conviction in the primacy of gluttony didn’t allow it. In fact, the evidence has always been clear, but it can’t be reconciled with the notion that obesity is caused by eating too much and exercising too little. Like Senator Bellmon, those of us who want to achieve and maintain a healthy weight can’t afford to think about obesity as an energy balance problem. It gets us nowhere we haven’t already been our entire lives. We have to think about it as a hormonal, metabolic, and physiological problem, perhaps akin to diabetes, as Astwood suggested. Some of us who don’t seem to have it now are going to get it as we age. Some of us aren’t. Some of us can load up on ice cream, pie, meat, and potatoes and stay lean as a west Kansas coyote; some of us can’t. But the foods we eat strongly influence the hormones responsible, as I’ll discuss. That’s textbook medicine. As such, the ubiquitous and seemingly obvious advice to eat “healthy,” as the authorities invariably define it, is not relevant to all of us. The adverb healthy in that advice is a synonym for eating as the lean and healthy tend to do, but we are not them. We fatten easily; they don’t. Doing as they do might surely be better for us than eating the standard Western fare of processed foods—“foodlike substances,” as Michael Pollan memorably called them—and drinking sugary beverages (sodas, fruit juices, energy drinks, mocha latte cappuccinos) morning to night, but that’s not good enough. It may also do harm or at least continue harm to be done. We have to eat differently because we are different.
Gary Taubes. The Case for Keto: Rethinking Weight Control and the Science and Practice of Low-Carb/High-Fat Eating (Kindle Locations 711-718). Knopf. Kindle Edition.
“We Cannot Afford to Wait" vs “serious reservations” about the “divergence of scientific opinion on whether dietary change can help the heart.”
“We Cannot Afford to Wait”
In the late 1970s in America, the idea that a plant-based diet might be the best for health as well as the most historically authentic was just entering the popular consciousness. Active efforts to demonize saturated fat had been underway for more than fifteen years by that time, and we’ve seen how the McGovern committee’s staff were in short order persuaded by these ideas. Even so, the draft report that Mottern wrote for the McGovern committee sparked an uproar—predictably—from the meat, dairy, and egg producers. They sent representatives to McGovern’s office and insisted that he hold additional hearings. Under pressure from these lobbies, McGovern’s staff carved out an exception for lean meats, which Americans could be advised to eat. Thus, Dietary Goals recommended that Americans increase poultry and fish while cutting back on red meat, butterfat, eggs, and whole milk. In the language of macronutrients, this meant advising Americans to reduce total fat, saturated fat, dietary cholesterol, sugar, and salt while increasing carbohydrate consumption to between 55 percent and 60 percent of daily calories.
While Mottern would have liked the final report to advise against meat altogether, some of the senators on the committee were not so unequivocally confident about their ability to weigh in on matters of nutritional science. The ranking minority member, Charles H. Percy from Illinois, wrote in the final Dietary Goals report that he and two other senators had “serious reservations” about the “divergence of scientific opinion on whether dietary change can help the heart.” They described the “polarity” of views among well-known scientists such as Jerry Stamler and Pete Ahrens and noted that leaders in government, including no less than the head of the NHLBI as well as the undersecretary of health, Theodore Cooper, had urged restraint before making recommendations to the general public.
Yet this hesitation turned out to be too little too late to stop the momentum that Mottern’s report had set in motion. Dietary Goals revived the same argument that Keys and Stamler had used before: that now was the time to take action on an urgent public health problem. “We cannot afford to await the ultimate proof before correcting trends we believe to be detrimental,” said the Senate report.
So it was that Dietary Goals, compiled by one interested layperson, Mottern, without any formal review, became arguably the most influential document in the history of diet and disease. Following publication of Dietary Goals by the highest elective body in the land, an entire government and then a nation swiveled into gear behind its dietary advice. “It has stood the test of time, and I feel very proud of it, as does McGovern,” Marshall Matz, general counsel of the McGovern committee, told me thirty years later.
Kelsay explains that fibre can cause blockages and reduce transit time, while also bulking stool.
June L. Kelsay, Ph.D.
Although it is supposed to travel through the gut at a faster rate, it does not always do so and it has been shown to cause blockages.
Stool volume
The inclusion of fiber in the diet resulted in increased stool bulk . Bulkier stooI were reported when wheat fiber bagasse, or cellulose were given, when a diet containing whole
maize, wheat and vegetables was fed, or when fruits were added to the diet.
Particle size of bran did not influence stool weight. In one study of patients with diverticular disease unprocessed bran did not increase stool bulk.
In the studies reported the amount of fiber added to the diet may not have been sufficient to result in decreased transit time .
The AHA “heart Mafia” had “supported the dogma” and hoarded research funds.
As George Mann wrote at the end of his career in 1978, a “heart Mafia” had “supported the dogma” and hoarded research funds. “For a generation, research on heart disease has been more political than scientific,” he declared.
High-fructose corn syrup enters the market
HFCS was rapidly introduced to many processed foods and soft drinks in the U.S. from about 1975 to 1985. Soft drink makers such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi still use sugar in other nations but switched to HFCS in the U.S. due to higher sugar costs.
HFCS is used in almost every packaged food and soft drink American consumers see today. HFCS has replaced more expensively priced sugar in a variety of uses including; the beverage industry (41%), processed food manufacturers (22%), cereal and bakery producers (14%), multiple-use food manufacturers (12%), the dairy industry (9%), and the confectionery industry (1%).
Hegsted’s and Foreman’s role to figure out how to implement the Dietary Goals.
It was Hegsted’s and Foreman’s role to figure out how to implement the Dietary Goals. And this task required at the very least some imagination, because by September 1978, the only thing USDA staffers had published on the subject was a suggested menu of thirteen slices of bread each day in order to meet the report’s recommended amount of carbohydrates. Could no one even come up with some palatable menu suggestions, asked a dietician quoted in the Washington Post.
Well, no, because although Congress had decided upon the components of a healthy diet, scientists were still quarreling over the basic evidence supporting those choices. Hegsted tried to put together an authoritative report on the matter at the USDA, but his effort fell apart amid bureaucratic infighting. Meanwhile, the esteemed American Society for Nutrition, which was also concerned about the need for a stronger scientific consensus before moving ahead with advice for the entire American population, had set up a formal task force to take another look at the diet and disease data and evaluate their strength. Hegsted decided to let his USDA recommendation be guided by the work of that task force. After all, the USDA’s efforts could only be made more credible by having expert support, since it remained true that no group of nutrition scientists other than the AHA nutrition committee (dominated by Keys and Stamler) had ever formally been convened to review the evidence on diet and disease to date. Hegsted knew that he was “taking a big chance . . . since Pete Ahrens of Rockefeller University was co-chairing the committee and was known to oppose general dietary recommendations.” Yet despite that risk, Hegsted agreed to abide by the panel’s decision.
Task force is skeptical of diet-heart hypothesis.
Ahrens chose a nine-member task force representing the full range of scientific views on the diet-heart hypothesis. The panel deliberated for several months over each link in the chain of the diet-heart hypothesis, from eating saturated fat, to total cholesterol, to heart disease. The results, however, were not exactly welcome news to diet-heart supporters like Hegsted or Keys. For instance, one issue the panel agreed upon was that the evidence condemning saturated fat was not persuasive. Moreover, the most they could say about fat generally was that it could be linked to heart disease only indirectly. The core problem was, as it had always been, the near-absence of clinical trial data on the low-fat diet, leaving only epidemiological studies. These studies, as we know, could show association but not prove causation. They had been enough for the Hegsted camp but not for the Ahrens camp.
The final report from the Ahrens task force in 1979 made it clear that the majority of its members remained highly skeptical of the idea that reducing fat or saturated fat could deter coronary disease. The group hadn’t explicitly said that the dietary goals would do harm, however, and so Hegsted chose to take this as a green light. Using the same tenuous logic as did Keys in assuming that he was right until proven wrong, Hegsted asked rhetorically: “The question . . . is not why should we change our diet, but why not? What are the risks associated with eating less meat, less fat, less cholesterol?” The view in ascendance among nutrition experts was that Americans should “hedge their bets” against heart disease by reducing dietary fat until more evidence emerged. Hegsted imagined that “important benefits could be expected,” and he could not imagine the costs. Ahrens’s committee countered that the principle of “doing no harm” demanded harder proof before proceeding with a change in the American diet, but Hegsted was not persuaded by this argument. And ultimately, the USDA was accountable not to academic scientists but to the US Congress, which had ruled definitively in favor of a new low-fat regime.
Gary Taubes wrote in his new book The Case For Keto a paragraph that I want to dedicate this database towards:
"I did this obsessive research because I wanted to know what was reliable knowledge about the nature of a healthy diet. Borrowing from the philosopher of science Robert Merton, I wanted to know if what we thought we knew was really so. I applied a historical perspective to this controversy because I believe that understanding that context is essential for evaluating and understanding the competing arguments and beliefs. Doesn’t the concept of “knowing what you’re talking about” literally require, after all, that you know the history of what you believe, of your assumptions, and of the competing belief systems and so the evidence on which they’re based?
This is how the Nobel laureate chemist Hans Krebs phrased this thought in a biography he wrote of his mentor, also a Nobel laureate, Otto Warburg: “True, students sometimes comment that because of the enormous amount of current knowledge they have to absorb, they have no time to read about the history of their field. But a knowledge of the historical development of a subject is often essential for a full understanding of its present-day situation.” (Krebs and Schmid 1981.)

